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Abstract: Rain-index insurance is strongly advocated in many parts of the developing
world to help farmers to cope with climatic risk that prevail in (semi-)arid rangelands
due to low and highly uncertain rainfall. We present a modeling analysis of how the
availability of rain-index insurance aects the sustainability of rangeland management.
We show that a rain-index insurance with frequent payos, i.e. a high strike level, leads
to the choice of less sustainable grazing management than without insurance available.
However, a rain-index insurance with a low to medium strike level enhances the farmer's
well-being while not impairing the sustainability of rangeland management.
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Large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, central Asia, Australia, and the Americas consist of
(semi-)arid regions with low and highly variable precipitation. The dominant land-use
in these areas is by subsistence livestock farming, which provides the livelihood for one
billion people. Due to highly uncertain precipitation, income from livestock farming
is very risky. Losses from droughts threaten in particular subsistence farmers in those
regions where economic institutions for risk management are scarcely available (Hazell
1992, Nieuwoudt 2000). At the same time, grazing management strategies not well
adapted to variations in rainfall lead to land degradation and desertication (Westoby
et al. 1989, Sullivan and Rohde 2002). According to UNCCD estimates, 41 percent of
the earth is vulnerable to land degradation, and drylands are expected to increase by
an additional 11 percent by 2080 in developing countries (UNCCD 2009). This trend
will accelerate due to climate change. While desertication is one of the major global
environmental problems, it is also a major economic problem, as the worldwide income
loss associated with desertication of agricultural land is estimated to some 42 billion
US dollars per year (UNCCD 2008).
Against this background, rain-index insurance has been advocated prominently as an
eective and economically sensible means to risk management and poverty alleviation.
For example, in 2006 the United Nations World Food Programme and the reinsurance
company AXA RE announced that for the rst time an entire nation's farmers would be
insured against drought (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2005, WFP 2006): for Ethiopia, a rain-
index insurance contract with a coverage of up to 5.8 million Euros was signed based on
rain data of 26 weather stations. Worldwide, there are more than a dozen smaller-scale
projects nanced by the World Bank to test the implementation of rain-index insurance
schemes (Skees and Barnett 1999, Miranda and Vedenov 2001, Hess et al. 2002, Skees
et al. 2002, WorldBank 2005, United Nations 2007, Barnett et al. 2008, Berg et al.
2009). Among the middle- and lower-income countries, Mexico and India have the most
developed rain-index insurance programs (Barnett and Mahul 2007).
A rain-index insurance means that a certain amount of money is paid to the insur-
2ant when a rain index that measures seasonal rainfall on a specied area falls below a
pre-specied strike level (Skees and Barnett 1999).1 A farmer can use such a nancial in-
strument to hedge his income risk if his income is positively correlated with rainfall. As
the income of livestock farmers in semi-arid regions is, in most cases, strongly correlated
with annual precipitation, a rain-index insurance actually functions as an insurance in
these cases. Rain-index insurance has some advantages compared to traditional crop in-
surance. Less transaction costs arise since the insurance contract is simple, independent
of farmer's behavior, dicult to manipulate, transparent, and easy to monitor (Skees
and Barnett 1999, Miranda and Vedenov 2001).
However, there is evidence that access of farmers to insurance may have ecologically
detrimental consequences. Farmers who have nancial insurance are likely to undertake
riskier production than uninsured farmers { with higher nitrogen and pesticide use
(Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993, Mahul 2001), with more soil erosion (Wu 1999), or
with reduced biodiversity conservation eorts (Baumg artner 2007, Baumg artner and
Quaas 2009a, Quaas and Baumg artner 2008). Zeuli and Skees (2005) investigate water
management in Australia and point out that weather-based insurance may lead irrigators
to consume more water rather than less. Bhattacharya and Osgood (2008) show in a
static model of a common property pasture that index-insurance may increase stocking
rates. One reason for these ndings is that often land management practices which
are sustainable, i.e. they are viable over the long-run in both ecological and economic
terms, at the same time provide \natural insurance", that is, they allow farmers to
reduce income risk at the price of some reduction in expected income (Widawsky and
Rozelle 1998, Di Falco and Perrings 2003; 2005, Baumg artner 2007, Di Falco et al. 2007).
This is a form of self-insurance (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). Specically, management of
(semi-)arid rangelands through resting part of the pasture in years with high rainfall
has been shown to maintain the ecological and economic productivity of the rangeland
system over time and, at the same time, to reduce farmers' income risk (M uller et al.
2007, Quaas et al. 2007).
In this study we investigate how the design of the rain-index insurance aects the
sustainability of rangeland management in (semi-)arid regions, in particular in Namibia.
3We employ a stochastic and dynamic ecological-economic model to assess (i) the benets
of rain-index insurance to farmers, and how these benets depend on the design of the
rain-index insurance, specically on its strike level; (ii) how the availability of rain-index
insurance changes a farmer's choice of grazing management depending on the insurance's
strike level; and (iii) what are the long-term economic and ecological consequences of this
change. For that sake, we explicitly include feedback dynamics between the ecological
and the economic system.
We show that while the availability of rain-index insurance improves the well-being
of risk-averse farmers it also creates an incentive to manage the land in a less sustainable
way. This trade-o depends on the rain-index insurance's strike level: the higher the
strike level the stronger are the incentives to choose less sustainable grazing management,
while the individual farmer's benets peak at intermediate strike levels. We conclude
that the strike level of rain-index insurances should be set at values much lower than
suggested by many previous studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the
model. The results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Generic model of rangeland ecology and manage-
ment
We base our analysis on an integrated dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic model
which is generic in that it captures essential and general aspects and principles of live-
stock grazing management in (semi-)arid regions. The basic model was developed in
previous analyses of good-practice examples, in particular Karakul sheep farming in
Namibia (M uller et al. 2007, Quaas et al. 2007, Baumg artner and Quaas 2009b). An
essential element of good-practice grazing management in (semi-)arid regions, which
therefore features prominently in the model, is resting part of the pasture in years with
sucient rainfall. To this model, we add here a stylized description of rain-index insur-





















































Figure 1: Schematic representation of the model structure.
Ecological sub-model: vegetation dynamics
The vegetation dynamics is mainly driven by two factors: precipitation and grazing.
Precipitation is measured in units of eective rain events per year, that is the number
of rain events that are eective in triggering plant growth. For easier handling a contin-
uous scale is assumed. Precipitation p is modeled as an independently and identically
distributed random variable, following a log-normal distribution. This is a right-skewed
distribution, where events with low rainfall are frequent, but eventually high-rainfall-















where  and  are the mean and the standard deviation of lnp.
To describe the vegetation dynamics we consider two characteristics of a single,
representative perennial vegetation type: (i) The green biomass Gt comprises the pho-
tosynthetic organs of the plant. This is also that part of the plant which serves as forage
for the livestock. The green biomass Gt in time step t is given by
Gt = wGptRt for t = 1;:::;T: (2)
where wG is a conversion parameter, indicating the extent to which the green biomass Gt
responds to reserve biomass Rt and current plant-available water pt. (ii) The \reserve"
5biomass Rt comprises the non-photosynthetic reserve organs below or above ground
which do not serve as forage (Noy-Meir 1982). The dynamics of the reserve biomass is
described by the following equation of motion:






Gt (1   dRt) (3)
A fraction m of reserve biomass Rt is lost between the end of one growing season and the
beginning of the next due to maintenance respiration and mortality. The reserve biomass
increases by photosynthesis in proportion to the amount of eective green biomass with a
proportionality factor wR. A density dependence in reserve biomass growth is captured
by the factors containing the parameter d. The higher d, the lower is the growth of
reserve biomass. In order to determine how growth of reserve biomass Rt is driven by
photosynthesis in green biomass Gt we account for the impact of grazing. For this sake,
we measure the number of livestock in terms of green biomass available as forage. Full
stocking, St = Gt, means that all available forage is used. In this case the growth of
reserve biomass by photosynthesis is reduced by a factor 1   c with 0  c  1. A value
of c near 0 (1) indicates a low (high) impact of grazing on the dynamics of the reserve
biomass. With less than full stocking (that is, with resting some part of the pasture),
i.e. St < Gt, the eect of grazing on the reserve biomass is reduced proportionally.
Economic sub-model: grazing management, insurance, income, and utility
Grazing management is assumed to follow a \resting in rainy years"-strategy, where the
farmer fully stocks in normal or dry years and stocks below the maximum (that is, gives
the pasture a `rest') in years with high rainfall. This type of strategy is applied in many
good-practice farms in Southern Africa, and belongs to the class of rotational resting
(or: rest rotation) strategies, which are well-adapted and commonly used in (semi-)arid
regions (Hanley 1979, Heady 1999, Quirk 2002). The key feature of the \resting in rainy
years"-grazing management strategy is that in dry years the whole pasture is used,
while in years with high rainfall, i.e. if actual rainfall in that year exceeds the threshold
value of pgr 2 [0;1), measured in percent of mean annual rainfall E(pt), a pre-specied
fraction  2 [0;100%] of the pasture is rested, which means that St = Gt (1   =100%)
6if pt > pgr E(pt) and St = Gt if pt  pgr E(pt). Hence, the farmer's grazing management
strategy is a rule (;pgr) that determines whether resting takes place, and to what
extent. We assume that the farmer chooses a grazing strategy before rst grazing (i.e.
in year t = 0) and applies it in every subsequent year. In order to focus on environmental
constraints and risks { rather than on market constraints and risks { we assume that
the livestock numbers can be adapted to the desired level at no costs.
Rain-index insurance is modeled as a specic-event contract with a xed payo as in
Turvey (2001). The insurance provider oers a unit rain-index insurance (1;pins) with a
payo of 1 if precipitation falls below the \strike", a xed annual rain level pins, which
is measured in percent of the long-term mean annual rainfall E(pt).2 At time t = 0
the farmer decides about the amount i of insurance that he buys for every year. Thus
he gets a payo of i in any year with rainfall below pins. The farmer annually pays a
premium bi to the insurer, where b is the premium for a unit of rain-index insurance.
The net payo IIns
t in year t from the insurance, i.e. indemnity benet i minus insurance
premium bi is (1   b)i > 0 if actual rainfall is below the strike level, pt  pins E(pt),
and  bi < 0 if actual rainfall is above, pt > pins E(pt). We assume an actuarially fair
insurance. That means the annual unit premium b is equal to the expected indemnity
payo of the insurance in every year.
The farmer's annual income from livestock grazing is given by the revenues of selling
livestock products such as meat, milk, fur and wool. This income is assumed to arise
in proportion to the number St of livestock on the farm. Assuming further a constant
price for the farm's products and normalizing it appropriately, the farmer's income from
livestock products simply equals the number of livestock, St. Including the rain-index
insurance, the farmer's net income It in year t corresponds to the income from livestock
products plus the net payo from the insurance, IIns





Gt if pt  pgr E(pt)








 b + i if pt  pins E(pt)
 b if pt > pins E(pt)
(4)
The farmer's preferences over the uncertain stream of present and future income are













where  > 0 is the farmer's degree of constant relative risk aversion and  > 0 is his
rate of time preference. The expected value E() is calculated over the probability
distribution of all possible time proles of future rainfall.
Sustainability criterion
We measure the long-term sustainability of grazing management by employing a measure
of strong sustainability, requiring both the farmer's income (as an economic indicator of
sustainability) and the stock of reserve biomass (as an ecological indicator of sustainabil-
ity) to be maintained over the long-term future. Under conditions of environmental risk,
it is not possible to guarantee sustainability over the long term with 100% certainty, even
with a very conservative grazing management. Instead, we employ ecological-economic
viability as a suitable criterion for strong sustainability under conditions of environmen-
tal stochasticity (a general description of the concept is provided by Baumg artner and
Quaas 2009b).
Viability, loosely speaking, means that the dierent components and functions of a
dynamic, stochastic system at any time remain in a domain where the future existence of
these components and functions is guaranteed with suciently high probability. For the
case of rangeland management we require that predened threshold levels of the farmer's
income,  I, and reserve biomass,  R, shall be obtained at a point T in the far future with
suciently large probabilities. Formally, the management of a farm, consisting of the
grazing management strategy (;pgr) and the amount of rain-index insurance i, is called
sustainable, if the following two conditions hold at some point T in the distant future:3
Prob(IT   I)   qI (6)
Prob(RT   R)   qR : (7)
In the subsequent analysis, we determine the left hand sides of these equations, i.e. the
probabilities that certain thresholds of income and the reserve biomass are surpassed.
8The farm management is sustainable if these probabilities exceed given thresholds  qI
and  qR.
Calibration and simulation method
The ecological and climatic parameters were calibrated according to the ecological model
in M uller et al. (2007) where also a sensitivity analysis was performed to analyze the
qualitative behavior of the model. The parameters for the discount rate and the degree
of relative risk-aversion are chosen according to the results from a survey with 360
respondents among approximately 2.200 Namibian livestock farmers and experiments we
conducted with 39 Namibian farmers (Olbrich et al. 2009). Table 1 gives an overview of
the parameter values used in the simulations. For the simulations and optimizations we




Growth rate of green biomass wG 1.2
Growth rate of reserve biomass wR 0.2
Strength of density dependence d 0.000125
Impact of grazing c 0.5
Climatic
conditions
Mean annual rainfall E(pt) 1.2
Standard deviation of annual rainfall (pt) 0.7
Farmer's
preferences
Risk aversion  2.0
Time horizon T 30
Discount rate  0.25
developed specic MATLAB (version R2009a) codes. In order to solve the stochastic and
dynamic optimization problem, the MATLAB routine fminsearch that uses a Nelder-
Mead simplex search method (Lagarias et al. 1998) turned out to be most ecient.
Expected values are calculated as averages taken over one million runs.
93 Results: Rain-index insurance and the sustain-
ability of rangeland management
Result 1: Resting in rainy years as investment and natural insurance
To start with, we ignore rain-index insurance and analyze the role of resting in rainy
years for income, income risk and pasture condition. We want to test the following
hypotheses: First, both a larger fraction of resting (i.e. a higher value of ) and a lower
rain threshold (i.e. a lower value of pgr) means that the strategy is more conservative
in the sense that the means of both reserve biomass and income are higher in the long
run. Second, the \resting in rainy years"-strategy provides natural insurance in the way
that it reduces income variability.
Figure 2 shows the expected income at time T, E(IT), for many dierent grazing
management strategies (;pgr) 2 [0;100%][0;240%] and two time horizons (T = 1 and
70 years). For a very short time horizon (T = 1), a grazing strategy with little resting,
i.e. a low fraction  of rested pasture and a high rain threshold pgr, generates the highest
expected income (Figure 2a). For a very long time horizon (T = 70), the qualitative
behavior changes strongly (Figure 2b). Strategies with an intermediate level of resting
generate the highest expected income. This is due to the fact that high livestock number
and, consequently, high income can be ensured over the long run only if reserve biomass
production is maintained by applying some resting. This is the case for conservative
strategies (Figure 2d). If the strategy is too conservative, however, the potential of
the high reserve biomass in the long-run is not used. Hence, while farmers who apply
substantial resting in rainy years do not generate the maximum possible short-term
income, they obtain a greater expected income in the long term. That is, resting in
rainy years may be regarded as an investment: it increases future expected income at
the cost of reduced present income.
How income risk, measured by the coecient of variation of income at time T,
Sd(IT)=E(IT), depends on the grazing management strategy is shown in Figure 2e and
f. For both T = 1 and T = 70 the lowest income risk results from medium levels
10Expected income at T
a) T = 1 b) T = 70
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Coecient of variation of income at T
e) T = 1 f) T = 70












































Figure 2: Expected income E(IT) (a,b), expected reserve biomass E(RT) (c,d) and
coecient of variation of income CV (IT) = Sd(IT)=E(IT) (e,f) at times T = 1 (for
reserve biomass T = 10) and T = 70, for dierent strategies characterized by the
fraction of resting  (in percent) and the rain threshold pgr (in percent of mean annual
rainfall). Lighter (darker) shades of grey indicate lower (higher) values of E(IT), E(RT)
and CV (IT). 11of resting in terms of both rested fraction of land and rain threshold. The reason is
that these strategies generate in dry years additional (otherwise rested) pasture. Hence
livestock number has to be reduced less compared to strategies which include almost
no resting ( < 10%) or resting in almost each year (pgr < 50%). In other words, the
strategy \resting in rainy years" involves a natural insurance eect for farm income.
Hence, a risk-averse farmer has an incentive to apply such a strategy for the insurance
eect it provides.
Result 2: Rain-index insurance is benecial for the farmer
In the following, we study the eects of introducing a rain-index insurance in the follow-
ing way: For a given strike-level pins of the insurance, the farmer chooses both the amount
of rain-index insurance i, and the grazing management strategy (;pgr). As rain-index
insurance obviously changes the statistical characteristics (i.e. mean and coecient of
variation) of income from livestock farming when applying a particular grazing man-
agement strategy, the question arises in which way does rain-index insurance change a
farmer's choice of the grazing management strategy.
Figure 3 (left graph) shows the optimal amount of insurance as a function of the strike
level. The gure shows that it is optimal to choose a lower amount of insurance the
more frequently the benet is received, i.e. the higher the strike level is. The right graph
in the gure shows the dierence between the net present value of a farmer's utility with
and without rain-index insurance. The dierence is unambiguously positive, indicating
that the availability of a rain-index insurance improves the farmer's well-being. The
gure also shows that the optimal strike level from the farmer's perspective is at about
50% of the long-term mean annual rainfall.
Result 3: Rain-index insurance crowds out natural insurance
Figure 4 shows how the availability of rain-index insurances with dierent strike levels
pins aect the farmer's choice of a grazing management strategy. The solid curve in the
graph on the left shows the optimal fraction of resting  with insurance, the solid curve
in the graph on the right shows the optimal rain threshold of the grazing management



























































Figure 3: Optimal amount i of rain-index insurance (left), measured in percent of the
maximal average income, i.e. the average income that could be obtained from a pristine
pasture with full stocking, and the dierence between the present value of utility (V )
with and without rain-index insurance (right) as a function of the strike level pins of
rain-index insurance.
strategy pgr with insurance. The dotted lines show the corresponding values without
insurance.
A rain-index insurance with a strike level of up to about 20% of long-term mean
rainfall has little eect on the choice of the grazing management strategy. For higher
strike levels, the optimal grazing management strategy becomes less and less conserva-
tive, as both the optimal fraction of the pasture rested, , decreases and the threshold
pgr above which resting is applied increases. This shows that the rain-index insurance
serves as a substitute for the natural insurance obtained from a grazing management
with resting in rainy years.
A sensitivity analysis of the preference parameters  and  has shown that a lower
degree of risk aversion  or a lower discount rate  reduce the magnitude of eects
observed, while a higher degree of risk-aversion or a higher discount rate increases the
eects. The intuitive reason for these results is as follows: A higher degree of risk-
aversion increases the need for insurance, thus increasing the trade-o between rain-






































































Figure 4: Optimal fraction  (in percent) of resting for dierent strike levels pins of
the rain-index insurance (left), where ^  denotes the optimal fraction of resting without
rain-index insurance, and the optimal rain threshold pgr of the grazing management
strategy (right), measured in percent of mean rainfall, where ^ pgr denotes the optimal
rain threshold without rain-index insurance.
index insurance and natural insurance. A higher discount rate means that the investment
motive for a conservative grazing management strategy becomes less important. Hence,
the natural insurance function of a conservative grazing management strategy becomes
relatively more important.
Result 4: The higher the strike level of rain-index insurance the less sustain-
able is rangeland management
Consequently, the sustainability of grazing management also depends on the type of
rain-index insurance available to the farmer. Figure 5 shows our results concerning the
sustainability of the optimal grazing management strategy for dierent strike levels of
the rain-index insurance. What is shown in the gure are the probabilities that dened
threshold levels of income (left graph) and reserve biomass (right graph) are reached at
the end of a time horizon of 70 years. The threshold for income is set to 25% of the
maximal average income, i.e. the income that is obtained from a pristine pasture with
14the respective grazing management strategy, averaged over rainfall. The threshold for
the reserve biomass is set to 25% of the initial reserve biomass of the pristine pasture.
The upper (lower) bounds of the shaded areas in the graphs in Figure 5 depict the
probabilities for the respective thresholds at 20% (30%) level.






























































Figure 5: Sustainability of rangeland management as a function of the rain index in-
surance's strike level. Sustainability is measured as the probability (in percent) that
25% of maximal average income (left) and 25% of maximal reserve biomass (right) are
reached at the end of the time horizon, T = 70 years. The upper (lower) bounds of the
shaded areas depict the probabilities for the respective thresholds at 20% (30%) level.
The results basically resemble the nding that with a higher strike level, i.e. a rain-
index insurance that pays o more often, the optimal grazing management strategy is
less conservative. Accordingly, it is less sustainable in both economic and ecological
terms: a higher strike level of the rain-index insurance leads to a lower probability that
both the threshold level of income and of the reserve biomass are reached at the end of
the 70 year time horizon.
Importantly, the negative eect of the rain-index insurance is comparatively small
for low strike levels of up to about 30% of long-term mean rainfall. The reason is that
if the insurance pays out not in \normal" drought years but only in extreme drought
years, the farmer needs to overcome \normal" drought years by the natural insurance
15which includes resting in rainy years. Hence the farmer needs to manage the rangeland
in a sustainable way to ensure low income risk. In other words, in this case the nancial
insurance covers the catastrophic risk layer and the self-insurance covers the lower-level
risk layers.
4 Conclusions
We have analyzed the role of rain-index insurance for grazing management in semi-
arid rangelands. In particular, we have studied the well-adapted and commonly used
grazing management system under which part of the rangeland is rested in years with
suciently high rainfall. Though in the short run the farmer forgoes income, resting
in rainy years generates benets to the farmer in two respects. First, resting enables
to maintain the productivity of the pasture in the long run. Thus, it is an investment
that, while carrying short-term opportunity costs, in return generates a higher future
income. Second, resting in rainy years reduces income variations over time and, thus,
income risk. Hence, it acts as a natural insurance. This creates an additional incentive
for farmers to employ sustainable management practices.
Against the background of this well established grazing management system, we have
studied the eects of making rain-index insurance available to livestock farmers, as it
is currently being advocated by e.g. the United Nations and the World Bank. We have
considered the strike level of the rain-index insurance as a policy variable, because this
is the part of the insurance contract that could be regulated most easily. We have found
three major results:
First, the introduction of a rain-index insurance improves the farmers' welfare. The
individual farmer's benet of a rain-index insurance is highest for an intermediate strike
level of about 50% of long-term mean rainfall according to our simulation results.
Second, natural insurance by a conservative grazing management strategy and nan-
cial rain-index insurance are substitutes for the farmers' risk management. As a result,
the introduction of a rain-index insurance leads to the choice of grazing management
strategy that provides less natural insurance and that is less sustainable in the long run.
16Third, for strike levels between 30 and 50% of long-term mean annual rainfall there
is a trade-o between the individual farmer's well-being and sustainability. Increasing
the strike level increases the farmer's well-being, but reduces the sustainability of range-
land management. Thus, while our study predicts dire environmental consequences if
rain-index insurance is introduced in its presently advocated form with relatively high
strike levels, our study also suggests modications in the insurance design that will al-
leviate these problems. If the strike level is lowered considerably { to a level of about
30% long-term mean annual rainfall { so that the indemnity payment is granted only
in years of severe droughts, a rain-index insurance brings considerable benets to the
farmer, while not impairing the sustainability of rangeland management. The reason
is that resting in rainy years remains an important strategy to reduce income risk by
natural insurance to overcome not-so-severe droughts when the insurance would not pay
out. So, the adverse incentives from introducing rain-index insurance can be minimized
if the insurance scheme is designed accordingly, in particular if the strike-level is low-
ered considerably compared to current levels. This conclusion contrasts with previous
suggestions of much higher strike levels. For example, Turvey (2001) assumed a strike
of 95% of long term mean annual rainfall and (Skees et al. 2002) use 67%.
A general conclusion from our study is that if socio-economic institutions for manag-
ing income risk, such as rain-index insurance, are designed for introduction into systems
where people so far rely on natural insurance through particular forms of ecosystem
management, as millions of farmers do in many developing countries, the incentives for
farmers to change their management strategies when insurance becomes available have
to be kept in mind. Only an explicit consideration of these feedback dynamics avoids
negative consequences on the state of ecosystems and, thereby, on farmers' economic
wealth in the long-run.
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Notes
1From a nancial economics point of view, a rain-index \insurance" is a specic weather derivative
rather than an insurance in its proper sense. Weather derivatives are traded in the USA since 1997,
mostly based on temperature-related \assets", such as Heating Degree Days or Cooling Degree Days
(Garman et al. 2000). It is a call option with a xed payo, which the farmer, who is long such a call,
receives in case the value of the asset falls below the strike level.
2In general, the strike level pins is dierent from the threshold pgr above which stocking is reduced
under the grazing management strategy (;pgr).
3If the sustainability criteria are fullled at time T, they are necessarily fullled also in the nearer
future, i.e. at any time t  T, as initially the pasture is in a pristine state and the reserve biomass
gradually declines with grazing.
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